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This paper seeks to analyse the formation and change of the European Union’s WMD 
non-proliferation policy. The change of this policy is the result of the double, parallel 
evolution of the WMD concept and of the EU institutional framework. 
In section one, the two evolution processes are reviewed through the analysis of the EU’s 
key-documents about the WMD non-proliferation issues. Section two overviews the 
implementation of the EU non-proliferation policy and emphasizes the significance of the 
“horizontal” nature of this policy field. Section three sorts out and examines the main 
constraints on the effectiveness of the EU WMD non-proliferation policy. The 
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The EU WMD non-proliferation policy is explained by the experts as the result of 
the evolution of two parallel processes: the evolution of the concept of Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) and its implications at the world level and the 
evolution of the EU’ s institutional framework. Although this last evolutionary 
process has its own roots and dynamics, it can largely be explained as a reaction 
to the first evolutionary process. Therefore, the institutional development of the 
EU has been a necessity to develop a EU WMD non-proliferation policy, which at 
its turn, has been a reaction to the changed global security environment. 
EU WMD non-proliferation policy is considered as still fragmentary and 
disappointing, mainly because of the “young age” of this policy area, on one side 
and, on the other side, because the EU is a still-in-evolution political entity 
looking for a place and a role at the global level and, at the same time, looking for 
an internal equilibrium (between Member States and EU institutions and between 
the EU institutions themselves). The consequences of this “double immaturity” 
are, on one hand, an overlap of competencies between MSs and EU institutions 
and within EU institutions; on the other hand, some lacks and, last but not least, 
a certain distrust on the side of MSs toward a more “Communitarian” framing of 
the issue. 
At the same time, the EU is trying to develop its own security model, based on a 
multilevel and global approach which seeks to achieve security goals through 
several policy areas, dulling (or trying to dull) in this way and little by little, several 
existing barriers. 
At the beginning of the 1990s, two closely connected factors, related to the 
transformed security environment, compelled the European Community to 
upgrade its role in non-proliferation. First, the end of the Cold War which allowed 
for a strengthening of multilateral approaches (since during the Cold War nuclear 
arms control had remained an almost exclusive domain of the superpowers) and 
second, the disclosure of the Iraqi nuclear programme in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War in 1991 which delivered a powerful impulse for increased international 
efforts in preventing proliferation.
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At the dawn of the 21
st
 century, several events caused the “realistic turn”
2
 of the 
EU concept of security and strategies such as the terroristic attacks of New York 
(9/11/2001), Madrid (3/11/2004), and London (7/7/2005). This second “turn-point” 
in IR raised the problem of new global threats, re-shaping the concept of security 
and challenging the States’ capacities to face it.  
These global events have to be considered in order to better understand and 
explain the evolution of the EU’ s commitment to non-proliferation. 
Section I analyses the EU’ s key-documents related to WMD non-proliferation; 
section II explores the policy implementation, while section III takes into account 
some constraints to an EU non-proliferation policy. 
ANALYSIS OF THE EU’S KEY-DOCUMENTS 
A number of developments catalysed the creation of an EU non-proliferation 
strategy in 2003. First of all, at the time, the EU was under pressure to respond 
to the possibility of non-state actors carrying out mass-impact terrorist attacks, 
including attacks using WMD. Another reason was the imminent enlargement of 
the EU to include 10 new members
3
. A framework was needed to accommodate 
new states with different security capabilities, traditions and routines. Finally, the 
United States-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, which intended “to eliminate a 
proliferation threat”, revealed policy differences both within the EU Member 
States and between the EU and the United States
4
. The need to find unity in this 
critical scenario became stronger than ever. 
As emerged from the Extraordinary European Council, which took place in 
Brussels on 21 September 2001, the development of the CFSP and the making 
operational of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) were seen as 
conditio sine qua non to face the new challenge.
5
 
At the Thessaloniki Summit, the European Council adopted a Declaration
6
 on the 
Proliferation of WMD along with a set of “Basic Principles for an EU Strategy 
against Proliferation of WMD” and its corresponding “Action Plan”.
7
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These documents originated in a Council decision dating back to April 2002
8
, 
which was taken within the framework of the fight against terrorism.
9
 The 
European Council announced that it intends to further elaborate a coherent EU 
strategy by the end of the year and continue to develop and implement the EU 
Action Plan “as a matter of priority”
10
. The “Basic Principles” is meant to be a 
“living document” subject to review and updating.
11
  
1.1 The European Security Strategy 
The EU “Security Strategy”(ESS), which was adopted on the same occasion in 
the form of another report by the High Representative for CFSP Javier Solana, 
unequivocally identifies WMD as “the single most important threat to peace and 
security”.
12
In the address to the 58th General Assembly, the Presidency pointed 
out the non-proliferation of WMD as a priority.
13
It also indicated that “the EU is 




In October 2003, Solana appointed Annalisa Gianella as his personal 
representative on WMD proliferation. The final version of the WMD Strategy was 
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published alongside the European Security Strategy (ESS) called “A Secure 
Europe in a Better World”, in December 2003.
15
  
The ESS lists WMD proliferation among the “New Threats”, together with 
“Terrorism” and “Failed States and Organized Crime”. As the document states, 
these three international threats have to be analyzed and faced together due to 
their inter-dependency which leads to a unique “very radical threat”.  
The ESS document is divided in three main sections: in the first section the three 
new threats are listed; in the second part the strategic objectives are pointed out, 
while in the third section detects the policy implications for Europe.  
It is evident from the redaction of the document how proliferation of WMD and in 
particular nuclear proliferation and its related threats are a highly relevant 
concern for the EU. In framing the issue, WMD proliferation is defined as “the 
single most important threat to peace and security among nations” and the 
possibility of a WMD arms race is envisaged, in particular in the Middle East 
which is not, however, the only identified region considered at risk; in fact, while 
pointing out the strategic objectives of the EU, North Korea and  South Asia are 
also located as potentially dangerous zones that deserve a particular attention. 
The analysis of the nature of the threats mentioned in the ESS leads to the 
identification of “ certain common points” between them (they are often distant, 
dynamic and none of them is purely military) which serve as base upon which 
start to conceive a strategy for action. As consequence of the nature of the 
threats, the traditional meaning and concept of security is totally reshaped
16
, 
implying a more dynamic and versatile EU’ s (re)action. Due to the often distant 
nature of the threats, the EU’ s strategy has to be more dynamic since “the first 
line of defence  will be often abroad”, while the fact that these new menaces are 
dynamic involves the EU’ s capacity to “act before a crisis occurs” and therefore 
it implies a further development of an EU’ s ability of conflict prevention and 
threat prevention. Third necessary requirement to the EU, in order to face the 
new challenges and consequence of the third common point between the threats 
(none of them is purely military), is the development of mixed capabilities, both 
military and civilian.
17
Concerning this last point, a “two speeds” EU’ s defence 
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system can be identified: while the EU has already developed efficient civilian 
capabilities and some civilian instruments are already identified in the ESS itself 
to face the threats and especially the proliferation issue,
18
 military capabilities are 
lacking and this is quite clear from two facts. First of all, the explicit reference to 
the US as guarantor, through NATO, of the EU’ s security
19
 and in general terms, 
the fundamental support from and dependence to NATO when dealing with 
military operations such as the military operation in FYROM and the role of 
NATO in the Balkans and second, the admission of a need to develop military 
capabilities
20
 (and this is clear from the third section of the ESS), but above all, 
the need of coordination /coherence between EU’ s instruments in the CFSP and 
ESDP and also between EU’ s instruments and member states’ s external 
relations.  
Is ESS significant to non-proliferation of WMD?  
In the EU Security Strategy, the proliferation of WMD is described as “potentially 
the greatest threat to our security”
21
.  However, it is worth noticing that the ESS is 
a political declaration which does not have any legally binding value but its 
existence had and has a remarkable weight in the EU’ s policy. Leaving aside the 
controversial real reason for its own existence
22
, the ESS puts the basis for an 
European WMD non-proliferation strategy by locating hot zones (namely North 
Korea, South Asia and the Middle East), declaring the modus operandi (basically 
multilateralism in international organizations
23
 and partnerships with key-actors
24
) 
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 “Trade and development policies can be powerful tools for promoting reform” (ESS, 
p.10) and “Proliferation may be contained through export controls and attacked through 
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 A EU’ s reaction to external events such as the terrorist attacks and the US-led invasion 
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strategy and its consequences on the internal division among EU’ s member states and 
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(ESS, p.15). Concerning the threat of WMD proliferation, the international organization 




and pointing out some instruments (mainly measures to tighten export control 
and deal with illegal shipments and illicit procurement, joint disarmament 
operations, support to third countries combating terrorism and security sector 
reform).   
1.2 Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against WMD Proliferation  
and related Action Plan for the Implementation  
On 14 April 2003 the Council instructed the Secretary General/High 
Representative, in association with the Commission, and the Political and 
Security Committee, to pursue work on proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction with a view to make proposals for submission to the European 
Council. Member States have contributed to a number of specific proposals. 
Drawing on these, as well as on the targeted initiative to respond effectively to 
the international threat of terrorism, adopted by the Council on 15 April 2002, the 
Council Secretariat and the Commission have drawn up a set of basic principles 
defining the broad lines for an EU strategy against proliferation of WMD.
25
  
On 10 June 2003, the Political and Security Committee of the EU agreed on 
the Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction. The document includes an Action Plan for the Implementation of the 
Basic Principles for an EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction . The Action Plan grouped measures to be undertaken by the EU into 
two categories: measures for immediate action and measures to be implemented 
over a longer period.
26
  
The Basic Principles is a thirteen points document resuming in general lines the 
strategy that the EU intended to adopt in WMD non-proliferation matters. 
As already stated in the ESS, a link between proliferation of WMD and terrorism 
is made in the potential scenario of terrorists acquiring WMD or related materials, 
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International Atomic and Energy 
Agency, measures to tighten export controls and to deal with illegal shipments and illicit 
procurement.” (ESS, p.11). 
24
 The quoted countries are: the USA, Russia, Japan, China, Canada and India (ESS, 
p.15). 
25
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Concerning the approach that the EU intends to apply to reach its goals, 
multilateralism and commitment to existing international organizations, regimes 
and norms engaged in WMD non-proliferation matters is confirmed, as well as 
the task of implementing and universalising the existing disarmament and non-
proliferation norms, in particular the NPT. This “normative/institutional approach” 
together with political dialogue and diplomatic pressure are the first instance 
instruments set to pursue the objectives
28
, while some other coercive measures 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter and international law, such as sanctions 
(selective or global), interceptions of shipments and, as appropriate, the use of 
force, are listed as last resource, in case of non compliance. It is expressly 
written in the document that, for this second order of instruments, the UN 
Security Council should play a central role, at the point that it is defined the “final 
arbiter on the consequences of non-compliance”. Apart from the role of 
contributing guarantor on the countries’ compliance to non-proliferations policies, 
much of the EU’s strategy is “prevention-oriented” (one more element taken from 
the ESS). On the non-compliance side, in order to deter it, prevention is made 
through the establishment of additional international verification instruments and 
the use of non-routine inspections under international control beyond facilities 
declared under existing treaty regimes, but, in a broader sense, the EU 
recognises the importance of applying a crisis prevention strategy by fostering 
the establishment of regional security arrangements and regional arms control 
and disarmament processes. For this purpose, particular attention is paid to the 
Mediterranean region. Cooperation with key-partners (USA and the Russian 
Federation) is encouraged. Last, cooperation with the EU SitCen is mentioned to 
prepare and update threat assessment using all available sources, contributing in 
this way to the crisis prevention process. 
The importance of this preliminary strategy lays primarily in the identification of 
non-proliferation as a priority for the Union, giving it a strong mandate to mobilise 
resources to this aim, both internally and in its external activities. Notably, the 
first measure suggested in the Action Plan is the drafting of a detailed plan of 
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 Basic Principles for an EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass 
Destruction, p.1. 
28
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diplomatic action, which effectively compels Member States to improve co-
ordination and to search for political agreement.
29
  
These broad objectives have been translated down to some more precise 
initiatives. Many of them are intended to have an EU-internal function: some are 
institutional measures designed to upgrade the capacity of action of the Union, 
such as setting up a Monitoring Centre on WMD disarmament and non 
proliferation, the inclusion of a permanent WMD threat assessment in the tasks 
of the EU Situation Centre, and the creation of specific Community budget line 
for non-proliferation and disarmament of WMD. 
Other measures are intended to strengthen EU internal legislation, such as the 
adoption of a legal framework for the criminalisation of illegal brokering of WMD-
related items.  
A further group of measures aims at enhancing the efficiency of the Member 
States’ export controls, most notably through the adoption of a policy of no export 
of nuclear related materials and equipment to the countries that have not ratified 
the IAEA Additional Protocols.  
Finally, a few of the measures listed are effectively proposals for EU external 
action ripe to be translated into CFSP instruments, such as promoting the 
negotiation of an agreement on the prohibition of the production of fissile material 
for nuclear weapons (FMCT), enhancing the financial contribution to IAEA 
safeguards, promoting catch-all clauses in export control regimes, or renewing 
the CTR programme in Russia. 
On the whole, the documents’ principal emphasis is placed on enhancing the 
effectiveness of the existing regimes rather than suggesting new steps for the 
non-proliferation agenda; the only exception is the introduction of conditionality, 
as stated in the Action Plan “the EU will consider the introduction of an effective 
carrot and stick policy linked to non-proliferation commitments in its relations with 
third countries. This will be done in particular in the context of cooperation 
agreements or assistance programmes”.
30
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1.3 EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
On 12 December 2003, the “EU Strategy Against Proliferation of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction”  was agreed on at the Council in Brussels.  
The language adopted in the strategy recalls the other key documents (the ESS, 




The WMD proliferation and their means of delivery are considered a “growing 
threat to international peace and security”
32
, creating a sort of climax in the 
definition and framing of the issue through the documents: in the ESS, the WMD 
proliferation is indicated as “potentially the greatest threat to our security”
 33
, while 
already in the Basic Principles the potentiality of the threat disappears, leaving 
the existence of a real (perceived) “international threat to peace and security”
34
. 
Last, in the Strategy the WMD proliferation threat is even a “growing threat”
35
, 
adding a dramatic tone to the international scenario.  
 It is worth noticing that already in 2003, before the adoption of the Treaty of 
Lisbon, the Strategy talked about “EU’ external action” and framed the fight 
against proliferation of WMD as a central challenge to this action. For example, 
as suggested in some paragraphs of the Strategy when stating that the EU will 
face the challenge using “all the instruments and policies at its disposal”
 36
 and 
again in chapter II affirming that “(…) our conviction that non-proliferation should 
be mainstreamed in our overall policies, drawing upon all resources and 
instruments available to the Union (…)”. 
37
Some of these EU policies are listed in 
the document itself when stating that “At the same time, the EU will continue to 
address the root causes of instability including through pursuing and enhancing 
its efforts in the areas of political conflicts, development assistance, reduction of 
poverty and promotion of human rights”
38
. Although it is true that a link had been 
already established and stated between the non-proliferation “policy” and other 
EU’ s policies such as trade and development, a series of formal elements within 
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the treaty did create a sort of separé between the WMD issue and the other 
communitarian policies (see infra). 
The strategy included operational elements such as the establishment of a 
monitoring centre to collect information and intelligence relevant to the strategy’s 
implementation and a biannual review of implementation by the General Affairs 
Council. The WMD Strategy offered a multilayered approach that was based on 
“effective multilateralism” which implies the universalization and strengthening of 
the existing non-proliferation treaties and agreements and providing political, 
financial and technical support to verification regimes, thus ensuring detection 
and compliance.  
The WMD Strategy, like the ESS, points out two typologies of modus operandi:  
preventive measures (which is the preferred way of action) and coercion as last 
resource in case preventive measures fail. But in this second case, as it was 
already stated in the ESS, the EU still recognized the United Nations Security 
Council as the “final arbiter”.
39
 
The only coercive and “fully European” policy used by the EU to promote non-
proliferation was the so called WMD clause
40
 (already suggested in the June 
2003 Basic Principles).  
1.4 New Lines for Action 
In 2008 France initiated a review of the WMD Strategy, and the Council 
Conclusions of December 2008 endorsed a statement on international security 
that identified specific actions “to enable the EU to play a more active role in 
combating terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, organised 
crime and cyber attacks”.
41
 The Council asked Member States to give substance 
to this statement by adopting appropriate policies and instruments, which then 
formed the basis of the New Lines for Action (NLA).
42
 New Lines read that “Close 
coordination between EU institutions and Member States will be necessary to 
ensure coherence and synergies between ongoing and future activities and 
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 It mentioned that the threat to Europe from WMD proliferation had 
grown since 2003, especially that of CBRN terrorism. New Lines offered little in 
terms of new initiatives or a change in the EU’s policy approach. Instead, it was 
mainly intended to raise awareness within member states of the growing WMD 
proliferation challenge, calling on government, scientific and academic circles to 
be better informed on non-proliferation matters and the potential risks of their 
own activities. One of the main changes was the request to SitCen to draft a 
document for evaluating trends, risks and threats regarding proliferation. This 
document was expected to better target and calibrate EU non-proliferation 
policies and also to focus the EU’ s geographical priorities regarding cooperation 
with third countries. Although New Lines offered itself as a modest update to the 
WMD Strategy, it was regarded as a call for more coherence and effectiveness of 
an EU WMD Strategy that had not (yet) delivered on its promises.
44
 
New Lines “completes” the alarmist language climax started with the ESS; in fact, 
the document suggested that the rise of private and illegal networks contributed 
to dissemination of dual-use technologies, adding to the WMD threat to EU 
citizens, and frequently mentioned the importance of “raising the awareness” 




From an analytical perspective, EU’s action in WMD non-proliferation matters 
can be broadly categorized in two main types. First, efforts aimed at 
strengthening existing regimes whose setting are generally multilateral fora. 
Second, approaches to regional proliferation issues which are implemented 
outside these frameworks.
 46
 On this purpose, Grip talks about the central policy 
of the EU WMD non-proliferation policy, known as “effective multilateralism”, as 
twofold since the EU not only supports and works with multilateral non-
proliferation regimes, but also assists non-EU countries to implement their 
commitments under the international non-proliferation regimes to which they are 
party
47
 or as it has been defined by other authors, “enforceable multilateralism”
48
.  
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Effective multilateralism is a policy of multilateral treaty-based governance of 
non-proliferation.
49
 Since 1993 the EU has had legal instruments at its disposal to 
implement its foreign and security policy in support of multilateral instruments 
and uses the CFSP budget to fund these policy  instruments.  
2.1 EU support to existing international regimes 
The EU has developed a series of initiatives in support of the NPT, the Additional 
Protocol, the CWC, the BWC, the CTBT, the UN Programme of Action on Small 
Arms, the Hague Code of Conduct (HCOC), and the Ottawa Convention.  These 
Joint Actions and Council Decisions imply both political support to the multilateral 
instruments and financial support to the international agencies in charge of 
verification. The majority of the Council decisions allocate funding from the CFSP 
budget to support multilateral treaties and bodies, such as the United Nations 
Security Council Resolution 1540’s Secretariat, IAEA, the Organization for the 
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and the Comprehensive Nuclear-
Test-Ban Treaty Organization (CTBTO). Since December 1999, the Council 
adopted 20 Joint Actions and since December 2008, 10 Council Decisions
50
 
concerning mainly European Union CFSP funding to selected non-proliferation 
regimes
51
. Some decisions introduced new legislation at the EU level, such as 
the enhanced EU regulation on the control of exports, transfer, brokering and 
transit of dual-use items, while other Decisions have introduced restrictive 
measures against individual states.
52
The objectives are the promotion of 
universality, the promotion of full compliance with the obligations under these 
treaties and generally enhancing the credibility of the multilateral 
regime.  Through these Joint Actions and Council Decisions, the EU has made a 
considerable contribution to preventing proliferation, by expanding the 
implementation of international norms, securing sensitive materials and facilities, 
enhancing national capabilities in the area of border controls against illicit 
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trafficking and re-directing former WMD scientists to peaceful 
activities.  Concerning the second component of the EU strategy, it mainly 
consist in assisting third countries to implement their commitments under the 
international non-proliferation regimes to which they are party and for this 
purpose, the EU disposes of several instruments.  
2.2 The WMD Clause 
Considering the economic and financial weight of the EU and, above all, its 
global-reach trade power, the EU disposes of a considerable bargaining power 
with third countries. This relative advantage has been used by the EU by 
applying a conditionality ratio in its relationships with third countries. In November 
2003 the EU adopted a policy regarding the management of non-proliferation in 
the context of its relationships with third countries. Language for a “non-
proliferation clause” (WMD clause) was agreed and was to be included in all of 
the EU’ s future mixed agreements with third countries.  As Grip explains, “Mixed 
agreements are agreements between the EU and a third country that include a 
combination of economic and political elements. They cover both matters that fall 
under the Community area of EU competence and political matters that fall under 
other areas of EU competence, such as security and defence. By inserting the 
WMD clause in mixed agreements it is theoretically possible to make trade, 
development assistance and other elements of cooperation that are under 
Community competence directly conditional on fulfilment of commitments in the 
area of non-proliferation, which is under CFSP competence. Unlike 
Community-only agreements, which can be adopted by the Council (usually by 
qualified majority vote), mixed agreements require a consensus vote in the 
Council and must also be signed and ratified by all EU Member States before 
they enter into force, because of their political content”.
53
 The WMD clause was 
introduced under the technocratic term “mainstreaming” which referred to the 
established practise of making trade, development assistance and other 
elements of cooperation directly conditional to the fulfilment of certain 
commitments and obligations, in this case in the area of non-proliferation.
54
This 
clause contains an engagement to cooperate and strengthen the fight against the 
proliferation of WMD and their vehicles through the ratification of the main related 
international treaties and agreements and through the establishment of efficient 
export-control system which has to include a control system over transit 
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operations and a deterrent sanctions regime. Since 2003, this clause has been 
inserted in all the new agreements, as well as in the renewal of CFSP 
agreements under art. 24 TEU negotiated with third countries, covering now 
almost 100 countries
55
 and its contribution to the non-proliferation of WMD 
seems to be determinant.
56
 The “conditionality ratio” is not new to the EU; this 
policy of mainstreaming uses the same conditionality that the EU has used in 
relation to promoting human rights and democracy in third countries. Criticisms 
surrounding this kind of strategy are likely in the HRs and democracy promotion 
policy as well as in the WMD non-proliferation policy. Although effective 
mainstreaming is considered fundamental for the EU to actively defend its values 
and interests by making trade and aid contingent upon “good behaviour” of third 
parties (and this is particularly stressed in the 2008 NLA), the WMD clauses have 
been preliminarily agreed but not signed with, for example, China, Libya, South 
Korea and several Central American states, while some progress has been 
achieved in negotiations with Russia, Singapore, Thailand, the Philippines and 
Viet Nam.
57
 Only two mixed agreements that incorporate the WMD clause have 
actually entered into force and neither of them will have a significant impact since 
they involve poor countries without WMD capabilities and aspirations.
58
 In 
relations with countries where a WMD clause could have a real impact, 
negotiators from both sides have avoided framing the bilateral cooperation as 
“mixed agreements”. For the past four years, the EU and India have been in 
negotiations for a far-reaching free trade agreement (FTA), but it was decided 
early on that the FTA would not be tied to any political conditionality.
59
 Since the 
EU is likely to accept India’s intransigence, this will further undermine the 
credibility of mainstreaming CFSP matters within the EU and abroad.
60
 The same 
situation is visible in the HRs and democracy promotion policy. The gap between 
facts and rhetoric makes the EU appear as an irrational actor since its criteria of 
selection are far to be understandable and identifiable. Brummer, analyzes the 
EU’s inconsistency through some dataset such as Freedom House 2008 (political 
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and civil liberties), Bertelsmann Transformation Index (status and management 
index), UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict dataset 2006 (war and minor conflicts) and 
HIIK Conflict Barometer 2008 (war and severe crisis) and highlights the EU’s  not 
so value-driven approach since not all the countries that violated the CFSP’s 
objectives (as set out in Article 11 TEU), have been sanctioned and quite often 
the targeted states are weak, authoritarian and/or politically isolated such as 
Belarus, Moldova, Myanmar and Zimbabwe. However, it is important to stress 
the intergovernmental set-up of the CFSP which can be (and it is) translated as 
fragmentation of the EU’s foreign policy as long as its Member States will pursue 
their own interests. An example can be the attempts of the German Chancellor 
Schröder and the French President Chirac, in 2005, to end the arms embargo 
against China upon which had been imposed Autonomous European sanctions 
in 1989 because of the Tienanmen issue, but the request was not motivated on 
the basis of a Chinese improvement with respect to political and civil liberties but 
because of some Member States’ interest in the trade of arms (economic and 
strategic aims).
61
 Neither the negative conditionality has been an efficient 
democracy promotion instrument because of the use that the UE made of it. 
Europe has shown too much indulgence or inactivity towards authoritarian 
governments like towards the election of the Tunisian President Ben Ali in 
October 2004 or towards Libya, where punitive measures were used in response 
to its engagement in terrorist and WMD related activities. The “prize” for Libya 
has been an offer of a new trade and cooperation agreement from the EU 
despite there had  been no manifest changes with respect to the country’s 
political and human rights record.
62
 Similar criticisms and difficulties can be 
traced within the application and implementation of the WMD clause. Considering 
the text of the WMD clause in the November policy note was: 
 “The Parties consider that the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and 
their means of delivery, both to state and non-state actors, represents one of the 
most serious threats to international stability and security. The Parties therefore 
agree to co-operate and to contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons 
of mass destruction and their means of delivery through full compliance with and 
national implementation of their existing obligations under international 
disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and agreements and other relevant 
international obligations. The parties agree that this provision constitutes an 
essential element of this agreement. The parties furthermore agree to cooperate 
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and to contribute to countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction 
and their means of delivery by: 
• taking steps to sign, ratify, or accede to, as appropriate, and fully implement all 
other relevant international instruments; 
• the establishment of an effective system of national export controls, controlling 
the export as well as transit of WMD related of goods, including a WMD end-use 
control on dual use technologies and containing effective sanctions for breaches 
of export controls. 
The Parties agree to establish a regular political dialogue that will accompany 
and consolidate these elements.These two elements might be considered as 
essential elements on a case by case basis”.
63
 
 The WMD clause presents several shortcomings. First of all, it can be included 
only in mixed agreements and not in Community-only agreements because of its 
political content, or as it is stated in the official document “for reasons linked to 
the Community’s competences under the TEC”
64
. However, “where there exist 
Community-only agreements of a general nature, and where neither a flanking 
mixed agreement exists nor is envisaged, the Council will consider (personal 
italics) the principle of introducing an essential non-proliferation element in the 
EU-third country relationship through the conclusion of a parallel instrument 
establishing a link with the EC agreement. This parallel  instrument would contain 
a provision along the lines of the text attached”
65
. 
The fact of limiting the introduction of the WMD clause only in mixed agreements 
and not in Community-only agreements creates an obstacle to the possibilities of 
global and effective application of the clause, since political and economic 
considerations take over WMD proliferation concerns. In fact, as already 
explained, the procedure for the conclusion of agreements with third countries is 
not the same for the two types of agreements, with the voting procedure for 
mixed agreements being susceptible to be victim of “political blockage” due to the 
veto power of each member state. This state of facts is evident also by the 
language used in the Council note which highlights a certain caution in the 
imposition of the WMD clause toward all countries. 
In fact, the Council note, by stating that “the Council will consider” the possibility 
of this inclusion means that the Council has the right to not include the clause in 
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a considered agreement and it does not have to justify its choice. However, this 
uncomfortable situation, could be avoided by the Council by introducing some 
kind of conditionality but, in this case, from the analysis of the language implied, 
it is very possible that the formula of the WMD clause could be different from the 
“standard” one, in fact not by chance, the Council note uses the term “element” 
instead of “clause”. To sum up, not only the WMD clause is susceptible to not 
being imposed to all third countries, but it can also suffer of “variable geometry” 
in the drafting of its formula, by eliminating some inconvenient (see effective) 
restrictions for third countries in their commitment to WMD non-proliferation.   
The Council note is even more cautious by stating that, in case the WMD is 
included in a mixed agreement with a third country, but the third country does not 
respect its commitments and therefore in case of non-compliance, the 
suspension of the agreement is considered only as “last resort”, while “intensive 
consultations between the parties would take place (…)”. 
Concerns about the implementation and the effectiveness of the WMD clause 
have been expressed, in 2007, by Gerrard Quille, a policy adviser to the 
European Parliament who identified several obstacles to the implementation of 
the WMD clause since 2003 and raised some important questions, such as how 
to decide what forms the clause should take in agreements with different third 




The Council’s WMD strategy progress reports is, therefore, too optimistic when 
stating that the EU has concluded negotiations with almost 100 countries for 
agreements that include a clause “compatible with the spirit and the content of 
the WMD standard clause”
67
. From Grip’ s analysis, in fact, it is evident that “only 
two mixed agreements that incorporate the clause have so far entered into force. 
The clause’s inclusion has reportedly met resistance from third countries in most 
negotiations. Both of the agreements in force and most of the current draft 
agreements and  signed agreements not yet in force include both sections of the 
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WMD clause, but with only the fulfilment of existing obligations - in the first part - 
given essential element status”.
 68
 
2.3 Dual-use export control regime 
A key-element of EU WMD non-proliferation policy is  the EU specific export 
controls regime concerning dual-use items.
69
 The EU WMD Strategy highlights 
the importance of strengthening export control policies and practises concerning 
dual-use items, which can be used for both civil and military purposes. The 
export control of these items is governed by Council Regulation No. 
428/2009 setting up a Community regime for the control of exports, transfer, 
brokering and transit of dual-use items, as this concerns trade and is therefore 
within the Union competence. This Regulation is legally binding and directly 
applicable in EU Member States. However, MSs are involved as items listed in 
the Regulation cannot leave the EU territory without an export licence granted by 
the competent authorities of the Member State that need to implement the 
Regulation. The EU list of controlled items is based on control lists adopted by 
the international export control regimes: the Australia Group (AG), the Nuclear 
Suppliers Group (NSG), the Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) and the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). The fact that some EU Member States 
against their will remain outside of some regimes (third countries block their 
admittance requests) creates a loophole in the EU’s ability to implement controls 
effectively. The 2011 Management Plan for DG TRADE identified dual-use export 
controls as a specific area of focus, citing the number of available EU General 
Export Authorizations for dual-use items as one indicator for an effective EU 
export control system. Based on this indicator, DG TRADE set a mid-term target 
to July 2011 to increase the availability of the general licences by third countries 
from the current seven beneficiaries.
70
 General licences are exceptions to the 
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standard individual licences issued for export of sensitive products and their 
increase spread have natural proliferation concerns. DG TRADE’ s Dual-Use Unit 
is responsible for the internal side of export controls as part of the EU Common 
Commercial Policy by ensuring the proper functioning of the export control 
system and that the system increases harmonization between EU exporters. 
However, an effective implementation of such a policy is not an easy task for 
several reasons. 
1) Vague or lacking legislation: the NLA’s recommendations regarding punitive 
action for proliferation-related acts were followed up with very little action at the 
EU level. There are currently no international legal standards regarding penalties 
for export control or proliferation-related offences.  
Some “unclear” requirements can be derived from United Nations Security 
Council resolutions and from the international treaties regarding biological, 
chemical and nuclear weapons. None of the four export control regimes currently 
provide guidance on penalties and prosecutions.
71
 
The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty does not make reference to enforcement or 
penalties.
72
 UN Security Council Resolution 1540 declares that the proliferation 
of WMD and their means of delivery are a threat to international peace and 
security.
73
 The resolution aims to prevent non state actors from accessing WMD 
and to counter proliferation more broadly. The resolution obliges all UN member 
states to exercise effective export controls over such weapons and related 
materials. More specifically, it obliges member states to “establish, develop, 
review and maintain appropriate effective national export and trans-shipment 
controls” over nuclear, biological and chemical weapons and their means of 
delivery, and related items. This explicitly includes “appropriate laws and 
                                                                                                                                    
2011’, 20 Jan. 2011, p. 21. On licenses see <http://www.ec.europa.eu/trade/creating-
opportunities/trade-topics/dual-use/>. 
71
 The Nuclear Suppliers Group was established in 1975. In 1992 it published guidelines 
for the transfer of nuclear-related dual-use items. The Australia Group, founded in 1985, 
seeks to harmonize and enhance export controls to ensure exports do not contribute to the 
development of biological or chemical weapons. The Missile Technology Control 
Regime, founded in 1987, coordinates national licensing and enforcement efforts to 
prevent the proliferation of missile technologies. The Wassenaar Arrangement on Export 
Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-Use Goods and Technologies was established 
in 1996. 
72
 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, opened for signature 1 July 1968; 
entered into force 5 Mar. 1970. 
73
 UN Security Council Resolution 1540, 28 Apr. 2004. This and other UN Security 





regulations” and “establishing and enforcing appropriate criminal or civil penalties 
for violations of such export control laws and regulations”. Individual Member 
States determine the ways in which they will implement these obligations. 
UN sanctions on the transfer of dual-use items to the Democratic People’s 
Republic of North Korea (DPRK, North Korea), Iran and Syria do not include any 
requirements or even guidance on penalties. 
2) There are several differences among Member States: the legal framework for 
prosecuting WMD-related dual-use offences in the EU is a combination of EU 
and national laws. The EU Dual-use Regulation (it is therefore directly applicable 
across the EU) includes the control list of dual-use items for which a licence is 
required for export and, in certain limited cases, brokering and transit.
74
 18 EU 
Member States are responsible for implementing and enforcing these provisions. 
Licensing and product classification decisions remain within national 
competence, as does their enforcement. 
In addition to the EU Dual-use Regulation, Member States can adopt stricter 
national provisions such as additional control list items on public security or 
human rights grounds (Article 8), or stricter wording of the catch-all end-use 
control mechanism for unlisted items (Article 4(5)). The catch-all mechanism 
allows the competent EU Member State authorities to impose an authorization 
requirement if items are or may be intended for a WMD end-use, or in relation to 
a listed conventional military item in a destination subject to an embargo. If 
exporters are aware of such an end-use, they are obliged to inform the 
competent authorities.  
EU Member States have the option to add a stricter national provision, extending 
this information requirement to a situation where the exporter has reason to 
believe that there is a WMD end-use. This has implications for potential offences. 
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The use of such clauses thus reinforces differences between the penal laws of 
Member States. Penal law has remained within national EU Member State 
competence across all issue areas. Article 24 of the EU Dual-use Regulation 
requires MSs to “take appropriate measures to ensure proper enforcement of all 
the provisions of this Regulation” and to “lay down the penalties applicable to 
infringements of the provisions of this Regulation or of those adopted for its 
implementation”. Article 24 also provides that penalties for breaches of the 
regulation be effective, proportionate and dissuasive. However, the translation of 
this provision into the national penalty systems differs considerably across the 
EU and this creates challenges that arise from translating the EU Dual-use 
Regulation and embargo provisions, into different languages and legal 
terminologies and legal traditions.  
3) It is a political and politicized issue: the design, implementation and 
enforcement of export control legislation is in itself political, insofar as it is shaped 
and informed by political assessments and priorities. WMD-related cases in 
particular may be political and politicized. The media may be very interested in 
cases, thus increasing pressure to deliver results, and may possibly indirectly 
influence the process in one way or another. Prosecutors and intelligence 
services may also have conflicting interests. On the one hand, prosecutors may 
seek to prosecute suspected legal breaches, which requires gathering all 
available evidence in order to prosecute all of those involved. On the other hand, 
intelligence services may have an interest in protecting their sources and might 
prefer to monitor and disrupt transactions rather than prosecute them. 
4) A never-ending WMD evolution concept: the term “export controls” has 
commonly been used to describe the control of security-related items leaving the 
host country. However, the term “trade controls” more accurately reflects reality 
as it relates to, among other things, controls on brokering, transit, trans-shipment, 
financial flows, technology transfer (especially by electronic means) and technical 
assistance (e.g. manual services and the oral transfer of know-how), all of which 
create new demands and challenges from both a legal and practical enforcement 
perspective. Consequently, the focus of non-proliferation efforts has partially 
shifted from the physical movement of goods to the analysis of which elements of 
a transaction are relevant to, and should be subject to, controls. 
75
 
 In the light of these evolving threats, shifting security and foreign policy 
considerations and rapid scientific and technological developments, the EU 
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export control policy can play a central role for economic growth and security 
concerns and this is why it needs to keep pace. The “2013 Strategic Export 
Control Conference”, organised jointly by the European Commission and the Irish 
Presidency and which brought together 260 representatives of key industry 
associations and major companies, civil society and academia, Member States' 
authorities and European Institutions and which took place in Brussels on 26 
June 2013, aimed at providing a forum to discuss topical export control issues 
and options for adjusting the EU export control system (among which a review of 
the underlying principles and notions of export controls in light of broader policy, 
human rights and security considerations relating to the use of 
telecommunication and cyber-tools in violation of human rights) to rapidly 
changing technological, economic and political circumstances.
76
 
The involvement of industry associations is a key-element of the general framing 
of  EU fight against WMD proliferation. In fact, much of the revision of States’ 
national trade control regimes, in the last ten years, was aiming at reconsider the 
proliferation responsibility of non-State actors, not only in terms of terrorist 
groups, but also of industrial operators as additional (to national authorities) and 
necessary guarantors of an efficient fight against the proliferation of WMD.
77
 It is 
worth to consider that dual use items are a key-element for the competitiveness, 
at the global level, of several EU companies in the aerospace, defence and 
security sectors,
 78
 therefore a full and deep understanding on the importance of 
an efficient export controls regime on the side of industrial operators is essential 
to avoid that economic considerations take over security priorities. 
The centrality of export controls in preventing the proliferation of WMD and the 
actuality of this threat, has been highlighted also by the European Commissioner 
for Trade, Karel De Gucht during the 2013 Strategic Export Control Conference 
which took place in Brussels on 26 June 2013.
 79
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2.4 CBRN counter-proliferation security research projects 
In 2006 the EU introduced a framework for security research at the EU level, with 
a budget of €1.4 billion for the years 2007–13, as part of the Seventh Framework 
Programme for Research (FP7).
80
 FP7 Security research builds on transnational 
collaborative projects and networks, which apply public funding to research 
conducted by industry. Many of the projects include partners outside the EU (e.g. 
Israel) and projects often aim to develop products that can be sold to end-users 
or integrated into other programmes. By mid-2011 FP7 Security had funded 25 
projects on CBRN issues with over €100 million in FP7 financing and the 
Commission estimates that CBRN research will fund closer to 60 projects on 
CBRN issues with a total budget of €250 million under the 2007–13 budget 
period. The FP7 Security CBRN research structure is separate from the EU 
WMD Strategy framework. A CBRN research programme was not envisioned in 
the WMD Strategy, nor in New Lines for Action.
81
 The DG for Enterprise and 
Industry (DG ENTR), in this sense, is active through several security research 
projects in the field of CBRN counter-proliferation. Recently, the EU’s efforts to 
promote consistent chemical, biological, radioactive and nuclear counter-
proliferation R&D both within and beyond the EU was the focus of diverse views 
of a recent Security Research workshop in Brussels.  Discussion among its 
research participants was especially lively when considering how to fill the EU’s 
future “external” CBRN research gaps with partner countries. The topic’s 
complexity was debated during a 25 April roundtable entitled, “The External 
Dimension of Security: EU Science and Technology”. The event was organised 
by the Security Research project known as ARCHIMEDES
82
, a 36-months 
project launched in January 2012, with a budget of EUR 1.54 million, of which the 
EU contributed 88% (EUR 1.35 million)
83
. 
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2.5 External assistance and cooperation programmes and financial 
instruments 
EU’ s approach to WMD non-proliferation is framed in several policy areas and 
this is in line with the EU’s concept of security which is considered to be strictly 
dependent on development. For the period 2007-2013, the EU’s development 
action in the field of security and conflict is financed through two types of 
instruments: 
 the implementation of the policy at national and regional level is supported by 
geographical instruments, such as the European Development Fund (in the ACP 
countries), the Development Co-operation Instrument (in Latin America, Asia 
and South Africa), and the European Neigbourhoud & Partnership 
Instrument (in the neighbouring regions); 
 the Instrument for Stability (IFS), which has two components: a short-term 
component concerning crisis response and preparedness, and a long-term 
component in the context of stable conditions.
84
  
Differently from the WMD clause instrument, the Commission has more power in 
the management of the external assistance and cooperation projects on WMD 
non-proliferation, another instrument to implement EU WMD non-proliferation 
policy. This is particularly true after a reform of the Commission budget 
instruments, in 2007 which created the Instrument for Nuclear Safety 
Cooperation (INSC), as a successor to the TACIS nuclear safety programme and 
the new IFS
85
 to ‘”undertake development cooperation measures, as well as 
ﬁnancial, economic and technical cooperation measures with third countries” in a 
way that was complementary to the CFSP-ﬁnanced activities due to their long-
term components. Differently from TACIS which was focused on a specific 
geographical area, the IFS and the INSC were global in their scope of funding. 
This gave EU external assistance the option of moving away from an exclusive 
focus on the former Soviet Union to areas of emerging concern, such as 
countries with new nuclear power ambitions or regions with assessed 
proliferation risks due to, for example, terrorism. The WMD Strategy and the NLA 
were central in setting these new priorities for EU assistance, which in 2007 was 
renamed as “cooperation measures”.
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The two main frameworks in which the EU has committed this assistance are the 
G8 Global Partnership
87
 and the CBRN risk mitigation programmes ﬁnanced 




EU assistance programmes are governed by the rules set out in the Regulations 
of the EU financial instruments that support them. 
The IFS is primarily intended (under Article 3) to allow a prompt response to 
situations of crisis or emerging crisis. Around 75% of the budget allocated for the 
IFS for the years 2007–2013 is designated for this purpose.
89
 The remaining 25% 
is intended for providing assistance in the context of stable conditions for 
cooperation, including “risk mitigation and preparedness relating to chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear materials or agents.”
90
 Even though the “non-
proliferation” element was played down in the final regulation as compared to the 
original Commission’s proposal
91
, the IFS, following the expiration of TACIS in 
2006, emerged as “the sole Community instrument
92
 that can directly address 
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issues relating to the risks presented by the weaponisation of chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear agents”.
93
  
The aid provided must take into account the actions led by the other European 
instruments for external assistance. The implementation of the fund is based on 
geographical and thematic strategy documents, and on the multi-annual 
indicative programmes for each country. Special measures may also be adopted 
in response to exceptional crises or situations. 
The main implementer of external EU non-proliferation assistance projects is the 
DG for EuropeAid Development and Cooperation (DG DEVCO), which formally 
began its work in January 2011. DEVCO is responsible for drafting the thematic 
and geographical Annual Action Programmes and implementing their associated 
policies. DEVCO further provides technical and legal assistance and training to 
implement UN Security Council Resolution 1540, for example, through the 
Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA) on the region’s 
borders with China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. BOMCA, which is 
implemented by the UN Development Programme, is one of the largest 
Commission assistance programmes in Central Asia.
94
 
DEVCO and the EEAS prepare proposals under the Development Cooperation 
Instrument (DCI) and the European Development Fund (EDF).
95
 The EDF is 
outside of the Union budget and, therefore, not under the scrutiny of the 
European Parliament. It is, however, still managed by DG DEVCO. Concerning 
DCI, as one of the new instruments launched in January 2007, it supports 
cooperation with 47 developing countries in Latin America, Asia and Central 
Asia, the Gulf region (Iran, Iraq and Yemen) and South Africa. DCI has been 
used to fund EU assistance projects in third countries in the field of biosafety and 
biosecurity.
96
 Within the DCI framework, WMD non-proliferation has been 
included as a topic in bilateral dialogue between EU and India and Pakistan.
97
  
                                                                                                                                    
budget established to provide short-term assistance and the European Commission’s 
budget instruments used for long-term responses to global security threats.  
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When drafting administrative expenditure estimates for the EEAS, the HR holds 




The regional directorates within DEVCO fund assistance to third countries with 
the Union external budget instruments. For example, the Nuclear Safety Unit, 
placed under DEVCO’s Europe, Southern Mediterranean, Middle East and 
Neighbourhood Policy Directorate manages nuclear safety assistance, which 
includes safeguards projects in Eastern Europe (e.g. Russia and Armenia) and 
which are funded by the INSC and CBRN risk mitigation, which is funded by the 
long-term component of the IFS. The unit is responsible for the CBRN regional 
centres of excellence in the Middle East and any future centre in the regions 
under its mandate.  
The instrument for nuclear safety co-operation (INSC 2007-2013) came into force 
in 2007. Its main objectives are the promotion of a high level of nuclear safety, 
radiation protection and the application of efficient  safeguards of nuclear 
material in non-EU countries worldwide. It substantially extended its geographical 
coverage in 2011.
99
 The INSC is supported by the Regulatory Assistance 
Management Group (RAMG), which brings together EU regulatory bodies, 
including members of the European Nuclear Safety Regulators Group 
(ENSREG), to assist the Commission in defining regulatory components of the 
nuclear and radiation safety needs of potential beneficiary countries.
100
  
Under the DG DEVCO’  mandate falls the CBRN Centre of Excellence whose 
main purpose is to assist countries in building institutional capacity and in 
implementing a coherent and coordinated strategy for CBRN risk mitigation, as 
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required by their international commitments, while developing coherent national 
assistance packages tailored to a regional context.
101
 
2.6 The enlargement policy 
Another way through which the EU contribute to increase and strengthen global 
compliance to WMD non-proliferation regimes is through enlargement. DG for 
Enlargement (DG ENLARG) manages the Instrument for Pre-accession 
Assistance (IPA), which aims to help candidate and potential candidate countries 
for EU accession to implement the domestic reforms needed to fulfil EU 
requirements for integration. The IPA has funded some projects related to 
nuclear safety and security, such as repatriating irradiated fuel elements from the 
Vinca nuclear research reactor in Serbia to the Russian Federation. The IPA is 
the only geographic financial instrument in the external relations field not 
managed by the EEAS.
102
 
The DG ENLARG play a role in implementing the reform-focused goals of the 
EU’s non-proliferation strategy regarding, among other things, setting up (or 
maintaining) effective export control systems in neighbouring countries. On this 
purpose, Turkey and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia are required to 
apply the EU regime. Croatia, as became the 28th Member State of the EU on 1 
July 2013, Regulation 428/2009 and its amending regulations are fully applicable 
to Croatia as of 1 July. Therefore, dual-use items may be traded freely within the 
EU, including Croatia and a license to export dual use items from one of the 
other 27 Member States to Croatia is no longer required, with the exception of 
those items listed in Annex IV to Regulation 428/2009 for which a licence is 
required even for transfers within the EU.
103
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2.7 The “internal” dimension of the WMD Non-proliferation Strategy. 
Home Affairs policy 
Being a concern of international security, the proliferation of WMD had and has 
internal implications and it is therefore dealt as an internal security matter, a 
policy area whose competence is divided between EU institutions and Member 
States, under Title VI of the Lisbon Treaty.  
Through the Crisis Management and Fight Against Terrorism Unit, DG HOME
104
 
is responsible for assisting the authorities of the Member States in their 
implementation of the EU strategy to combat terrorism. The European Union 
Counter-Terrorism Strategy adopted in November 2005, makes a direct link 
between terrorism and proliferation (as already the ESS in 2003) and provides 
objectives to cut off terrorists’ access to attack materials, specifically WMD, 
delivery systems and dual-use products while depriving terrorists of the 
opportunities to “spread technical expertise related to terrorism”, thus addressing 
intangible knowledge transfers related to WMD proliferation.
105
 Internationally, 
the strategy identified that the EU “must work with partners and international 
organizations on transport security, and non-proliferation of CBRN materials and 
small arms/ light weapons, as well as provide technical assistance on protective 




DG HOME’s Crisis Management and Fight Against Terrorism Unit is also 
responsible for the implementation of the EU CBRN Action Plan, adopted by the 
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Council in November 2009.
 107 
The implementation of the Action Plan is a key 
part of the EU Internal Security Strategy in Action.
108
 
The Action Plan deals with the issue of non-proliferation by framing it as “the 
threat of a terrorist group acquiring Chemical, Biological, Radiological or Nuclear 
(CBRN) materials”
109
 and which has led governments and international 
organisations to adopt far-reaching regulations
110
 and programmes to defend 
populations against the associated risks. Based on an all-hazard approach, the 
Action Plan's overall goal is to reduce the threat of, and damage from CBRN 
incidents of accidental, natural and intentional origin, including terrorist acts. The 
Action Plan contributes to the implementation of the EU Counter Terrorism 
Strategy and is in line with the Internal Security Strategy
111
. The Action Plan is 
implemented by EU bodies, such as the European Commission, the EEAS and 
Europol
112
, Member States' public authorities and other relevant stakeholders 
such as the private sector, the health care sector and academic institutions. The 
IAEA and Interpol are closely associated to the implementation of the Action 
Plan. 
Through technical support and funding by the IFS, the INSC and Council 
decisions, the Action Plan sets out to enhance regional and international 
collaboration regarding CBRN security. One of the core recommendations of the 
Action Plan was to strengthen the EU’s effort to present a coordinated view in 
multilateral arms control arenas such as the IAEA, the OPCW, the BTWC 
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 Since 2008, Europol  manages a CBRN database of CBRN terrorism-related events 
and CBRN products and materials. 
113
 The Global Health Security Initiative (GHSI) is an international partnership of like-
minded countries to strengthen health preparedness and the global response to threats of 
CBRN substances and pandemic influenza. The initiative was launched by the G7 
countries (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United 




The main financial tools available to the Commission to support the 
implementation of the CBRN Action Plan are the specific programmes 
“Prevention, Preparedness and Consequence Management of Terrorism and 
Other Security Related Risks” (CIPS) and “Prevention of and Fight against 
Crime” (ISEC), both of which DG HOME manages.
115
 For the period 2007-2013, 
the EU has allocated EUR 140 million for CIPS, while ISEC has a budget of EUR 
600 million for the period 2007-2013.
116
 
2.8 Health policy and Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection 
CBRN issues are also dealt by the DG Health and Consumers (DG SANCO) 
through the Health Threat Unit. Addressing the threat of CBRN agents was a 
core objective in the EU Health Strategy “Together for health”
117
, adopted in 2007 
and defining bioterrorism as one of four major potential threats to health. On the 
basis of art. 168 TFEU, “A high level of human health protection shall be ensured 
in the definition and implementation of all Union policies and activities. Union 
action, which shall complement national policies, shall be directed towards 
improving public health, preventing physical and mental illness and diseases, 
and obviating sources of danger to physical and mental health. Such action shall 
cover the fight against the major health scourges, by promoting research into 
their causes, their transmission and their prevention, as well as health 
information and education, and monitoring, early warning of and combating 
serious cross-border threats to health (…)”.
118
 
However, health threats of radiological or nuclear origin causing exposure to 
ionising radiation are covered by the provisions of the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (Articles 2(b) and 30-39), which constitutes 
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the “lex specialis” in relation to Article 168 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union. 
 Being public health a competence shared between MS and EU, the EU’ s action 
aims at completing Member States national public system also by encouraging 
cooperation between MSs especially “to improve the complementarity of their 
health services in cross-border areas”
119
. In fact, according to the Health 
Strategy, Union-level action included scientific risk assessment, preparedness 
and response to bioterrorism as well as Union-level cooperation and coordination 
between MSs and international actors.
120
  
The DG SANCO finances non-proliferation projects in third countries, including 
“EpiSouth Plus”, jointly with DEVCO, and the health monitoring system “Alerting 
System and Development of a Health Surveillance System for the Deliberate 
Release of Chemicals by Terrorists”. EpiSouth Plus is a network for the control of 
public health threats and other bio-security risks in the Mediterranean Region 
and Balkans, which includes 9 EU Member States and 18 non-EU States. The 
Alerting System involves developing mechanisms for analysis and reporting 
information and consulting with EU Member States and stakeholders on health 
issues at community, national and international levels.
121
 The Commission 
coordinates health security measures in the EU through its Health Security 
Committee (HSC). The HSC is an informal cooperation and coordination body 
chaired by DG SANCO that meets twice a year and includes representatives 
from all EU Member States as well as from other relevant Commission 
departments and agencies (e.g. the ECDC)
122
. It addresses CBRN threats by 
concentrating on health-related threats from terrorism or any deliberate release 
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of biological or other agents. It also seeks to raise levels of preparedness for 
cross-border threats.
123
 The EU Health Programme 2008–13 provides financial 
support for the work of the HSC and actions on preparedness and response to 
CBRN threats to public health.
124
 
It is worth noticing that also the development of this EU security-oriented health 
policy is an internal reaction to the changed global security environment, as 
stated in the Commission Staff Working Document “Health Security in the 
European Union and Internationally” of 2009: “The strategic policy framework on 
health security was developed after the terrorist attacks in the USA on 11 
September 2001 and the subsequent anthrax scare. Other health threat incidents 
in Europe have also helped to shape the approach of the EU. In particular, the 
threat of CBRN agents, ranging from natural disease outbreaks to deliberate 
attacks, has demonstrated the need to be prepared for large-scale public health 
emergencies with significant international impact. Foreign security policy-makers 
have recognised this by creating a clear priority to put global health security 
higher on foreign policy agendas”.
125
 
Another DG involved in granting security against CBRN threats is the DG for 
Humanitarian Aid and Civil Protection (DG ECHO) through the Civil Protection 
Financial Instrument. The Civil Protection Financial Instrument is a budget 
instrument under the Euratom Treaty established by the Council Decision 
2007/162/EC.  It aims to “support and complement the efforts of the Member 
States for the protection, primarily of people but also of the environment and 
property, including cultural heritage, in the event of natural and man-made 
disasters, acts of terrorism and technological, radiological or environmental 
accidents and to facilitate reinforced cooperation between the Member States in 
the field of civil protection”.
126
  
The Commission is involved in providing logistical support for the assessment 
and coordination of the experts it deploys; facilitating the pooling of Member 
States’ transport and equipment resources; assisting the member states to 
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identify and facilitate their access to transport resources and equipment which 
may be available from other sources; and financing any additional transport 




CONSTRAINTS TO EU’S WMD NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY 
Constraints to the effective and efficient implementation of the EU WMD non-
proliferation policy are of different types and importance. 
3.1 The different nuclear status of the MS and their transatlantic links 
Eleven Member States are members of the NATO, two of which (the UK and 
France) are recognised nuclear powers. Four other Members host NATO nuclear 
weapons on their territory (Belgium, Germany, Italy, and the Netherlands). Four 
Member States remain protected by the Alliance’s nuclear umbrella (Denmark, 
Greece, Luxemburg, Spain and Portugal). Finally, four further non-aligned EU 




Different attitudes exist with regard to the transatlantic link. Relations with the US 
remain of great importance to the Union, but in security matters Member States 
display different degrees of preparedness to express divergences with the US 
policies. Regarding the members of the Alliance (which make up the majority of 
EU states), there is a fear that antagonising the US over nuclear issues will 
weaken the security relationship embodied by the Alliance. Therefore, the 
attitude of every single European State towards nuclear weapons is largely 
determined by its relationship with NATO.
129
 
 Due to the multiplicity of positions on nuclear questions and since the CFSP 
operates by consensus on substantive issues, the EU has only been able to take 
those initiatives on which everyone agreed. This has resulted in a selective 
approach to nuclear weapons issues which has privileged non-proliferation over 
disarmament. Even within the non-proliferation realm, the level of attention 
devoted to different issues has varied substantially. While some of them have 
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3.2 Institutional settings’ constrains 
If on one hand, the new institutional structure designed by the Treaty of Lisbon 
was an attempt to bring more coherence and unity within the EU, on the other, 
the new institutional setting did create some points of friction in several ways 
leading to a lack of consistency within the EU WMD non-proliferation policy. With 
regard to consistency of the EU’s international policy, Nuttall distinguishes 
horizontal consistency (between different types of EU policy), vertical consistency 
(between the policies of MS and the outcomes they have agreed upon within the 
CFSP) and institutional consistency (between two different bureaucratic 
apparatuses, of the Council and of the Commission).
131
 Concerning the EU WMD 
non-proliferation policy, while Kamil Zwolski focuses on the institutional 
consistency, identifying the first inter-institutional competition between the 
Commission and the Council General Secretariat, Lina Grip, mapping the EU’s 
institutional actors related to EU WMD non-proliferation policy, highlights the 
horizontal nature of the issue which still lacks internal coordination.  
3.2 a) European Commission Vs Council General Secretariat 
Concerning the WMD non-proliferation policy, the first point of friction is identified 
by K. Zwolski between the Commission and the Council General Secretariat.  
According to the author, “for many years, the EU’s policy on non-proliferation of 
Weapons of Mass Destruction  has been a victim of institutional fragmentation, 
imbedded in the post-Maastricht formal separation of the European Community 
from the CFSP. On the one hand, since the beginning of the 1990s, the 
European Commission was developing capacity-building projects on non-
proliferation and nuclear safety, utilising its geographical and thematic financial 
instruments. On the other hand, more recently, permanent bureaucratic 
structures entrusted with implementing the EU’s WMD Strategy were established 
in the Council General Secretariat. This posed a challenge to consistency of the 
EU’s non proliferation efforts and even triggered inter-institutional competition 
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 In this perspective, competition is the consequence of 
the evolution of two internal separate processes which  allowed each institution 
to increase its actorness in the field, developing two types of EU’s non-
proliferation policy: the one conducted by the Council General Secretariat within 
the CFSP framework and another one conducted by the Commission within the 
former Community framework. As described in Section I, the first efforts to 
develop a common non-proliferation policy started in the framework of the EPC 
(established in 1970 with the so-called “Luxemburg Report”), which was an 
informal and non binding framework since the report was not ratified by national 
legislation. Its establishment resulted in adopting a number of common 
declarations within the framework of international non-proliferation regimes, but 
these efforts were of purely intergovernmental character, not embedded in any 
formal institutional framework. In this context, the Treaty of Maastricht introduced 
important reforms, integrating the EPC into the structure of the Council of the 
European Union, thus establishing the CFSP. Initially, this intergovernmental 
cooperation was the only pillar of the European non-proliferation policy, because 
the Commission did not play any substantial role in this policy area. The situation 
changed in the 1990s, when following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, 
Russia was left with the largest CBRN stockpile, located in the largest number of 
buildings, with insufficient security and safety measures.
133
 In response to this 
threat of the proliferation of CBRN materials, the Commission got involved in 
providing technical and financial assistance which is known as the Technical Aid 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States (TACIS).
134
 With regard to 
preventing the proliferation of WMDs as such, redirection of former Soviet 
scientists became the most prominent area of involvement for the European 
Community.
135
 For this purpose, two scientific centres were established: the 
International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) in Russia and the Science 
and Technology Centre in Ukraine (STCU). Consequently, through its non-
proliferation and nuclear-safety assistance, the European Commission emerged 
as the second pillar in the EU’s non-proliferation policy but, the involvement of 
the Community in this policy area did not become the source of inter-institutional 
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tension for over a decade for two reasons. First, the activities of the Commission 
were considered of purely financial and technical character; second and most 
important, because the Council General Secretariat did not have a permanent 
non-proliferation bureaucratic structure until 2003. In fact, the inter-institutional 
tension started when the HR for the CFSP, Javier Solana, appointed Annalisa 
Giannella as his Personal Representative on non-proliferation of WMD in 2003, 
starting the “competition” with the Directorate-General External Relations (DG 
Relex), responsible for programming non-proliferation projects of the 
Commission.  
The consequence has been the development, since 2003, of the EU’s non-
proliferation policy in two separate institutions, with different cultures, instruments 
and resources. On the one hand, the Commission has been involved in long-term 
capacity-building activities of a relatively low political profile, but with significant 
resources at its disposal. On the other, the Council General Secretariat has 
become the main focal point for the EU to implement the WMD Strategy, mainly 
through international negotiations and agreements. 
The establishment and location, in 2006, of the WMD Monitoring Centre within 
the Council General Secretariat, which aimed at “‘enhancing effectiveness and 
consistency without any modification of institutional settings and prerogatives, by 
establishing a cooperative working method which allows the Council 
Secretariat/HR, the Commission services and Member States to work together, 
and ensure better synergy”
136
 is a proof indicating that Member States 
recognised the challenge of ensuring institutional consistency in non-proliferation 
policy long before establishing the EEAS and it was already scheduled in the 
WMD Strategy.  
The second condition contributing to the competitiveness between the two 
institutions, has been the Commission’s 2004 proposal for a regulation 
establishing the IFS.
137
 In contrast to the low-key activities of the Community 
under TACIS, the IFS was about to become the EU’s main instrument for 
delivering security-oriented financial assistance. The Commission’s proposal 
sparked controversy, leading to concerns that the Community pillar would 
effectively become an alarmingly powerful actor in non-proliferation policy, 
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Even though the “non-proliferation” element was played down in the final 
regulation as compared to the original Commission’s proposal, the IFS, following 
the expiration of TACIS in 2006, emerged as “the sole Community instrument
139
 
that can directly address issues relating to the risks presented by the 
weaponisation of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear agents.”
140
  
Furthermore, the Commission still had more significant resources at its disposal 
for non-proliferation and nuclear safety projects as compared to the resources of 
the Council within the framework of the CFSP. For example, in 2010, the CFSP 
budget for non-proliferation and nuclear safety was over €22 million,
141
 whilst 
average annual IFS and INSC budget for non-proliferation is around €112 million 
for the period 2007–2013.
142
 The Commission’s funding included both the IfS as 
well as the INSC, which took over the “nuclear safety” component of TACIS.
143
  
This financial discrepancy unveils the structural causes of inter-institutional 
competition between the Commission and the Council General Secretariat in the 
area of non-proliferation policy.  
It could be said that the former Director for Non-proliferation and Disarmament at 
the EEAS shares partially and indirectly this point of view, when stating that “the 
focus now seems to be not on the political initiative of the EU, but rather on 
assistance programmes and on financial instruments” and that “assistance 
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programmes can achieve good results” but, she adds “only if they are carried out 
in the context of political cooperation”
144
. The use of the modal verb “can” and the 
insertion of the second sentence starting with a “only if” let imply that these 
assistance programmes have not yet express their full potential and that the 
cause relies in political divisions. 
3.2 b) High Representative Vs European Commission 
The attempt to bring closer together the intergovernmental CFSP and the 
Communitarian external relations, aside from a simplification in the language of 
the Treaties implying the terms “EU’s external action”, was made also through 
the establishment of the double-hated High Representative for CFSP and Vice-
President of the European Commission, but while the new competencies of the 
HR might contribute to a greater consistency of European foreign policy, they 
could also give rise to new intra- and inter-institutional tensions at the EU level. 
First of all, the competencies conferred upon the HR in the intergovernmental 
dimension of EU foreign policy-making are complemented by the functions that 
he/she assumes in his/her role as Vice-President of the Commission and 
Commissioner for External Relations. If this rather broad mandate might be 
understood as providing the HR with an overarching coordinating role, which 
aims at increasing the coherence of all policies conducted by the Commission 
that have an external relations dimension,
145
 it has also been interpreted by some 
as giving the HR sole control over the four external relations portfolios of the 
Commission,
146
 thus constraining the power of some Commissioners. Moreover, 
given that under the Lisbon Treaty the Commission loses its right to submit 
proposals concerning the development of CFSP to the Council, the HR becomes 
the principal channel for Commission participation in EU external relations.
147
 
Second, the special status of the HR within the Commission, which results from 
his/her appointment by the European Council and his/her role as an overarching 
coordinator of Commission policies with an external relations dimension, could 
easily become a source of tension between the HR and the Commission 
President as well as individual Commissioners. The HR could pose a challenge 
to the Commission President’s traditional role as primus inter pares within the 
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 In terms of the relations of the HR with individual 
Commissioners, the long established principle that all Commissioners are equal 




Third, in addition to the possible tensions that the status of the HR might create 
within the Commission, it is also conceivable that due to a necessity to prioritise 
his/her various tasks, the HR will not be able to make the expected contribution 
towards reducing inconsistencies between the intergovernmental and 
communitarian aspects of EU foreign policy mainly because the HR is clearly 
accountable to the European Council, while his accountability to the Commission 
and its President as well as the EP remains rather ambiguous. In his/her own 
interest, therefore, the HR must be primarily concerned with accommodating the 
interests of the Member States in the formulation and implementation of EU 
foreign policy. At the same time, the HR’s credibility as an actor in international 
affairs will be dependent on the extent to which he commands the support of the 
MSs. 
 3.2 c) The European External Action Service - EEAS 
The establishment of the EEAS is seen by some authors
150
 as the recognition of 
the internal tension between the intergovernmental CFSP and EU’s external 
relations and therefore the attempt to overcome it. However, the structure of the 
EEAS is the result of the “fusion” of three main components: “one-third of the unit 
dealing with non-proliferation in the EEAS consists of officials formerly working in 
DG Relex of the European Commission; another one-third is composed of 
officials who used to work in Giannella’s office in the Council General Secretariat 
(Ms Giannella was appointed in charge of the non-proliferation unit of EEAS); the 
remaining one-third consists of the representatives of member states. This 
means that three bodies with distinctive diplomatic cultures and experiences 
work together, involved in developing two dimensions of the EU’s non-
proliferation policy, formerly developed by separate bureaucracies.
151
 
The fact that EEAS staff working in the non-proliferation area originate from 
different sources and corporate cultures could be helpful in that respect, as it 
combines the knowledge, experience and networks of the three different 
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structures to advance projects and to find a balance between the priorities of the 
Council and the Commission, but according to some officials who worked in the 
EEAS
152
, the practise seems to have been different from the theory. Apparently, 
the “multilayered” structure of the EEAS does create some problems of "loyalty" 
and therefore obstacles to an efficient and coherent work.  
The same insatisfaction about the EEAS has been expressed by the former 
Director for Non-proliferation and Disarmamene at the EEAS, Annalisa Giannella 
who argues that the EEAS does not seem to take full advantage of the new 
treaty and of the new structures.
153
   
3.3 Horizontal consistency 
The statement in the EU Strategy Against Proliferation of WMD, concerning the 
fact that the EU will face the challenge using “all the instruments and policies at 
its disposal”
 154 
together with the new framing of the EU’s external action within 
the Treaty of Lisbon allow for a more Communitarian framing of the issue. 
However, this horizontal framing of the WMD non-proliferation Strategy, though it 
wanted to be “global”
155
 in its approach to the issue, finished to be rather 
uncoordinated. 
A lack of coherency and coordination is identified by Grip at the level of the policy 
evaluation of the EU non-proliferation effort. The author describes this policy 
evaluation as a “decentralized evaluation system” which makes very difficult to 
jointly evaluate different institutional actors’  activities and programmes within the 
same policy area (e.g. non-proliferation activities under the CFSP and the IFS 
budgets).
 
In fact, the EU has several mechanisms in place to evaluate the 
implementation of  its non-proliferation policies. As a function of the CFSP, the 
disarmament and non-proliferation division in the EEAS follows the 
implementation of the WMD Strategy and the NLA on EU WMD Strategy by 
producing six-monthly progress reports. In addition, each implementing agent 
beneﬁting from EU funding is required to report to the Commission on project 
results and budget spending. The Commission evaluates its CBRN non-
proliferation projects and programmes based on the “ﬁnancial regulation” and the 
“communication on evaluation”. The ﬁrst, as spelled out in its implementing rules, 
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requires all programmes and activities involving “signiﬁcant spending” to be 
evaluated both before and after such spending.
156
 The communication on 
evaluation requires all Commission activities addressed to external parties to be 
periodically evaluated.
157
 These evaluations fall within the competence of the DG 
managing the instrument. For example, evaluation of activities funded by the IFS 
falls under the DG DEVCO.  
Each DG has an evaluation function responsible for ensuring that the 
conclusions and recommendations of evaluations are used to improve ongoing 
and future policy initiatives. The Commission Secretariat General coordinates the 
evaluation framework centrally and communicates priorities from the central 
function to the functional DGs through a network of representatives from the 
evaluation units. At the programme level, the Commission DGs and other 
institutional bodies in the EU may turn to independent evaluators. 
3.4 EU WMD non-proliferation policy: an intergovernmental content 
in  a Communitarian box 
If it is true that the Treaty of Lisbon abandoned the pillar structure, that the 
European Council “legalised” its position within the EU institutional setting and 
allowed for a more “Communitarian” framing of foreign policy issues (and in 
particular WMD non-proliferation) by the “EU’s external action” formula and by 
the linking roles of the HR/VP and the EEAS, it is also true that this apparently 
unifying setting hides, indeed, a more MS-controlled policy and this is possible 
through several “escamotages”.  
The Commission which had developed, since the 1990s, a competence in the 
field through assistance programmes and reinforced its role and power with the 
establishment of the IFS in 2007 (therefore before the entry into force of the 
Lisbon Treaty), saw its role and control power played down with the entry into 
force of the Lisbon Treaty because of the new competences of the HR/VP and 
the newly established EEAS. In fact, in the new institutional setting,  
the HR/VP:  
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- is in charge of conducting all responsibilities incumbent on the 
Commission in external relations and ensuring their consistency with 
other components of EU foreign policy (Art. 18.4 TEU); the HR has 
control over the four external relations portfolios of the Commission, thus 
constraining the power of some Commissioners; 
- has the capacity to entertain political dialogues with third parties and to 
express EU positions in international organisations and at international 
conferences (Art. 27 TEU); 
the Commission 
- loses its right to submit proposals concerning the development of CFSP 
to the Council; 
- loses its Delegations which are now an integrated part of the EEAS; 
- is responsible for the financial implementation of the CFSP budget and 
the IFS but under the authority of the HR, in the position’s capacity as 
Vice-President of the Commission and the Commission department 
responsible for this implementation is the Foreign Policy Instruments 
Service (SFPI) although part of the Commission, is housed alongside the 
EEAS; 
The Delegations of the EEAS (under the authority of the HR): 
-  undertake the representation of EURATOM in third countries and at 
international organizations such as the IAEA; 
-  monitor all IFS  programmes in the beneficiary countries; 
-  provide project proposals to the EEAS Secretariat and are directly 
responsible for the implementation of adopted assistance programmes, 
which allows negotiation and conclusion of contracts with local 
counterparts and also the monitoring of project implementation in the 
field. 
On the other side:  
- the HR is clearly accountable to the European Council, while his 
accountability to the Commission and its President as well as the EP 
remains rather ambiguous; 
-  the European Council’s right to identify the strategic interests and 
objectives of the Union in relation “to the common foreign and security 
policy and to other areas of the external action of the Union” (Art. 22.1 
TEU), in legal terms, means a significant extension of the competencies 
of the European Council to the Communitarian aspects of EU foreign 
policy. 
CONCLUSION 
In the light of the examined context, one question arises: does a unique and 
coherent EU WMD non-proliferation policy exist? 
As usual at the EU, any steps forward, in order to be achieved, has to be 
accompanied by a step backward or, at least, the possibility to step back. In this 
case, the steps forward have been the institutional novelties introduced by the 
Treaty of Lisbon in the name of EU’s coherency, coordination and visibility and in 




(the intergovernmental pillar of CFSP managed by the Council Secretariat and 
the  Community pillar of external policies managed by the Commission) and the 
establishment of the linking roles of the HR/VP and the EEAS. However, this new 
and more “Communitarian” framing of EU foreign policy hides old and new 
rivalries and loyalties, triggering a vicious cycle. 
The attempt to bring coherence and coordination through the HR and the EEAS 
is indeed undermined by the HR’s priority to “satisfy” the European Council to 
which he/she is accountable and Member States’ strategic interests. Because of 
Member States’ different strategic interests, a hot issue such as WMD non-
proliferation must rely on internal consensus which is difficult to reach due to 
MSs’ diverging positions which lead to an inconsistent and incoherent EU WMD 
non-proliferation policy which leads to a lost of EU’s credibility on the 
international scene which causes a decrease in effectiveness of EU’ strategies 
and policies to fight WMD proliferation. In this causal chain, EU’s “effective 
multilateralism” is not “effective” because internal mechanisms (see infra) have 
been established to impede this effectiveness and it is “multilateral” as 
multilateralism is the only condition circumscribed enough to serve as common 
ground and, open enough to let each actor do his own cost/benefit analysis in 
order to decide to be in or  to be out. Consequently, the EU’s activity regarding 
non-proliferation regimes avoids any divisive projects and focuses on areas 
where a strong consensus exists, most notably measures to improve the 
universality and verification of relevant non-proliferation treaties, export 
controls
158
 and the coordination of EU Member States in the non-proliferation 
regimes. This means, however, that the EU is mainly active where internal 
consensus is easily achieved, not where external demands are most pressing. 
For example, the EU’s reaction towards the US-India nuclear deal or North 
Korea’s nuclear weapon test
159
 has been, if at all, very limited. 
The internal mechanisms impeding an effective EU WMD non-proliferation policy, 
summarised are:  
1) the limitation of the inclusion of the WMD clause only in mixed agreements 
with third countries, requiring a consensus vote in the Council and the ratification 
by all EU Member States, (which is symptomatic since the application of a QMV 
procedure would have been too “permissive”); 
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2) the differences among Member States concerning the implementation of the 
legislation in the field of dual-use export controls;
160
 
3) the new institutional setting which, through the processes showed in 
paragraph 4.4, creates several points of friction between EU institutions and 
transferring EU’s “external action” into the HR’s hands, indirectly make the EU 
WMD non-proliferation policy a Member States-led issue with the main outcome 
of generating the above described vicious cycle.  
If it is true that the European Union exists because of Member States’ will, it is 
also true that MSs provided the EU with its own founding principles which are 
something more than the simple addition of the single MSs’ founding principles 
and there is more; MSs decided that “The Union’s action on the international 
scene shall be guided by the principles which have inspired its own creation, 




On these basis, EU Member States should find the courage to step out of their 
national dimension and launch themselves in the EU dimension, the only 
dimension able to maximise the general interest. 
Concerning the effectiveness of the EU WMD non-proliferation policy, if it works 
on the theoretical level, it can be improved empirically by making it “an European 
issue into an European box” by overcoming some of the above listed constrains. 
At the institutional level, the linking roles of the HR/VP and the EEAS should be 
more “Europeanised”, for example by making the HR directly accountable to the 
EP, so to be more independent from MSs’ will and to contribute to strengthen the 
EP’s role and HR’s democratic legitimacy. The EEAS should be composed only 
by EU officials who are EU-minded, so to avoid “loyalty crisis” which could lead to 
incoherent action.  
Finally, QMV should be the ordinary procedure as far as it is the best 
compromise between “democracy” and efficiency and it would avoid not to be too 
pro-EU states to do the good and bad weather in EU’s politics.  
Maybe a real unique and coherent EU WMD non-proliferation policy does not 
exist yet because, until now, an “European box” was seen as a satisfying 
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condition to deal with the issue but, a common understanding also of the content 
of the box is the only condition for an effective solution, wishing that the solution 
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